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BOOK REVIEW
How America’s Political Parties Change (And How They Don’t). Michael Barone, New York and London: 
Encounter Books, 2019, 130 pp. ISBN 9781641770781. Reviewed by Jack R. Van Der Slik, Professor 
of Political Studies and Public Affairs emeritus, University of Illinois Springfield.
Michael Barone is a veteran scholar and com-
mentator on American national politics. He is best 
known as an acknowledged expert on Congress, its 
members, and their constituencies. He has been 
a major author and contributor to The Almanac of 
American Politics, published biennially since 1972, a 
reference volume of nearly 2000 pages. Since 2001, 
Barone has been a contributor to the Fox News 
Channel and, since 2009, a senior political analyst 
for the Washington Examiner. The Examiner, with 
help from Barone, offers a more rightwing perspec-
tive on the news of the day than its more widely read 
liberal competitor, the Washington Post. 
Previewing this book in his “Introduction,” 
Barone makes the point that the dynamics of 
American presidential elections are occasionally cata-
clysmic, as in 1860, 1920, and 1932. However, he 
notes, “the change in party percentages [by voters] 
between 2012 and 2016—or between any presi-
dential election since 1996 and that of 2016— was 
minimal by historic patterns” (1). He goes on to say 
that what is notable about 2016 is that “The most re-
cent generation of our politics has been characterized 
by what I have called polarized partisan parity to an 
extent that is arguably unprecedented in American 
history” (italics added). Barone celebrates the “yin-
and-yang” of American diversity, “regionally, eco-
nomically, religiously, racially and ethnically, cultur-
ally—from its colonial beginnings.”
To understand the partisanship of American poli-
tics is to appreciate both the fixedness and the adapt-
ability of the two parties locked into a governmen-
tal structure with enduring boundaries. Our states 
elect presidents with votes in an Electoral College, 
apportioned by the numbers of House and Senate 
members each state has, based mostly upon popula-
tion. Our system is largely impervious to third-party 
intrusions. Barone characterizes the parties as fol-
lows: Democrats have “always been a collection of 
out-groups…not…regarded by themselves or others 
as typically American but which…make up a major-
ity of the nation. The Republican party has always 
been formed around a core group considered to be 
typical Americans, but which by itself has never been 
a majority of the electorate and must attract others to 
the party’s banner in order to win” (9).
Each party has had its streaks of success electing 
presidents. From 1897 to 1933, Republicans had six 
presidents (McKinley, T. Roosevelt, Taft, Harding, 
Coolidge and Hoover). That streak was interrupted 
only by Wilson, a Democrat, who won in a three-
way race with 42 percent of the vote in 1912. In 
a Republican party disruption that year, Teddy 
Roosevelt tried to displace his Republican succes-
sor, Taft, but both went down to defeat. Reelected 
in 1916 with 49 percent of the vote, Wilson won 
the war but lost the peace at Versailles, after which 
the Republicans reclaimed the presidency for another 
dozen years.
In 1932, Franklin Roosevelt put together an 
awkward electoral majority. Opponents of the 
party of Lincoln, Democrats who held hegemony 
in the previously confederate states, joined with 
discontented northern voters injured by the Great 
Depression under a hapless Herbert Hoover. They 
formed a Democratic electoral majority that held 
sway for twenty years under only two presidents, 
Roosevelt and Harry Truman. The Democratic 
streak was interrupted for two terms by a war hero, 
Dwight Eisenhower, who was courted by both par-
ties to be its presidential nominee. He chose to run 
as a Republican, twice defeating Democrat Adlai 
Stevenson. After that interregnum, the Democrats 
were restored to the presidency in a close contest 
in 1960 (John Kennedy) and a blowout in 1964 
(Lyndon Johnson).
Deeply disaffected by the Civil Rights Movement 
and disappointed in the Vietnam debacle, south-
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ern Democrats swung to the Republican nominee, 
Richard Nixon, in 1968. Nixon prevailed with a 
vote-margin of less than one percent of the votes 
cast. Nixon won handily in 1972 but was undone 
by Watergate. That resulted in his midterm resigna-
tion. His appointed Vice President, Gerald Ford, fell 
to Jimmy Carter in 1976 by a margin of only two 
percent. Carter managed to win just a one-term in-
terruption. In the 1980s, Republicans regained the 
presidency for three terms. Ronald Reagan surged to 
victory by 9.7 percent in 1980 and 18.2 percent in 
1984.
In the eight presidential contests since Reagan, 
the margins of victory never reached ten percent. 
There has been, as Barone called it, “polarized parti-
san parity.” Republican George H.W. Bush succeed-
ed Reagan in 1988 with a 5.6 percent voter margin. 
Democrat Bill Clinton defeated Bush in 1992 by 5.6 
percent and won again in 1996 by 8.5 percent.  But 
with third-party candidates in the races, Clinton re-
ceived less than a majority of the popular votes in 
both years. Republicans regained the presidency in 
2000, scoring an Electoral College win. 
George W. Bush trailed his Democratic rival, Al 
Gore, by 0.5 percent of the total popular vote. In 
2004, Bush was reelected with a 2.5 percent vote 
margin. Control of the presidency reverted to the 
Democrats in 2008 by a 7.3 percent margin for 
Obama, and he was reelected in 2012 with a 3.9 per-
cent voter edge.
In 2016, to the surprise of many commentators, 
Donald Trump prevailed by wearing the Republican 
label. Democrat Hillary Clinton went down to elec-
toral defeat, despite a 2.9 million popular vote mar-
gin over Trump. His portion of the electorate was 2.1 
percent less than that of his opponent, the highest 
percentage deficit to prevail in presidential electoral 
history since the disputed Tilden-Hayes contest in 
1876. The Electoral College results were clear, with 
304 votes for Trump out of the 538 in play. 
Barone identifies the keys to victory this way: 
“Of the 100 electoral votes that switched from 
Democratic in 2012 to Republican in 2016, 50 were 
in the Midwest—Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin and 
Iowa—and 20 were in Pennsylvania…. An addition-
al 29…were in Florida…. One more Democratic to 
Republican vote was that of the 2nd congressional dis-
trict of Maine…” (105). 
Barone accounts for the margin of Trump’s elec-
toral vote success by distinguishing between key dif-
ferences in the political constituencies of these key 
states where his electoral votes were achieved. In the 
metropolitan areas, most voters supported Clinton, 
but in the “outstate” areas Trump prevailed hand-
ily.  It was the voters in “counties outside those 
million plus metro areas…. Donald Trump carried 
the outstate Midwest by 57 to 37 percent…. To 
be sure, Trump’s victory margins in Michigan and 
Wisconsin were exceedingly narrow, as they were 
in Pennsylvania, and without the electoral votes of 
those three states he would have been defeated. But 
he won them and won the Midwest’s electoral votes 
by an 88 to 30 margin, the best Republican showing 
since the Ronald Reagan landslide of 1984” (115).
Barone’s acute analysis in this book is both intui-
tive and entertaining. The book recounts telling de-
tails of numerous presidential contests and deserves 
attention from a wide readership. Bringing his ac-
count to a conclusion, he resists making a prediction 
on the 2020 election outcome. But of that election 
he asserts that “the outstate Midwest could go back 
to providing crucial votes in electing Democratic 
presidents, as it did for Barack Obama in 2008 and 
2012,” thereby resolving the presidential outcome 
(118). 
With Barone, I will forbear from forecasting a 
winner, but I concur with Barone that the voting 
results in the Midwest are clearly tractable and may 
well be determinative for the coming—and likely 
close—presidential election. Judging from Barone’s 
insights and analysis, most of the voters who read Pro 
Rege reside at the cutting-edge where the next presi-
dential outcome will become a settled matter. 
